Trump Make America Angry Again Trump Is Making America Angry and Racist Again

Introduction

In the years since Donald Trump's unexpected victories in the 2016 Republican presidential primaries and general election, social scientists have attempted to better sympathize who his supporters are and what motivates their fidelity. Some have highlighted his populist appeal to a working class that felt betrayed past elites (Rahn and Oliver Reference Rahn and Oliver2016) and a globalizing economy (Sides and Tesler Reference Sides and Tesler2016; Wood Reference Wood2017), while others fence that his pugnacious mode and rhetoric was a natural fit for those exhibiting authoritarian characteristics (MacWilliams Reference MacWilliams2016; Choma and Hanoch Reference Choma and Hanoch2017; Womick et al. Reference Womick, Rothmund, Azevedo, King and Jost2019). All the same, almost scholars have focused on Trump'southward use of prejudicial language (Cohen Reference Cohen2017; Leonhardt and Philbrick Reference Leonhardt and Philbrick2018) to capture the support of those harboring racist (Major, Blodorn, and Major Blascovich Reference Major, Blodorn and Major Blascovich2018; Luttig, Federico, and Lavine Reference Luttig, Federico and Lavine2017; Hooghe and Dassonneville Reference Hooghe and Dassonneville2018) and misogynistic attitudes (Cassese and Barnes Reference Cassese and Barnes2018; Schaffner, Macwilllams, and Nteta Reference Schaffner, Macwilllams and Nteta2018; Valentino, Wayne, and Oceno Reference Valentino, Wayne and Oceno2018). These relationships are best contextualized as part of a broader backfire against social, demographic, economic, and political changes that have challenged white, male privilege in American society. Trump, still, did not merely give voice to these resentments; he legitimized them every bit a vital component in the battle for the soul of the nation.

In this paper, nosotros argue that Donald Trump utilized the rhetoric of American civil organized religion (ACR) to legitimize such resentments and embolden those harboring them. ACR, famously described by Robert Bellah every bit a "public religious dimension expressed in a set of behavior, symbols, and rituals with respect to sacred things," has over the course of the nation'southward history "provide[d] a religious dimension for the whole textile of American life, including the political sphere" (Bellah Reference Bellah1967, 3–4). Cartoon upon civil religious themes, Trump's rhetoric contextualized disparate sources of social resentment as emblematic of a broader story of American pass up whose restoration required a recommitment to a pre-1960s vision of American greatness. This vision reflects a romanticized Golden Age predating transformative social changes with respect to sexuality, gender roles, and civil rights. Equally such, Trump's call to "Make American Great Again" legitimized the defense of white male person privilege every bit the vital center of efforts to restore national glory.

While this use of civil religious themes emboldened those who harbored prejudicial views, it alienated others who interpreted such rhetoric every bit antithetical to the national identity. We agree with the emerging scholarly consensus that racism and sexism are powerful predictors of support for Trump, yet nosotros argue that, considering he has relied on civil religious themes to legitimize such sentiments, the presence of the former tends to exacerbate the furnishings of the latter. Relying on a unique module within the 2018 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), we demonstrate that ceremonious religious Americans who harbor racial resentments and misogynistic sentiments are significantly more supportive of Donald Trump than those who are not civil religious, because he has provided a item sort of patriotic justification for such animosities. Conversely, civil religious Americans who abominate such prejudicial beliefs are significantly less supportive of Donald Trump than those who are non civil religious, because they view his rhetoric as an assault on the soul of this nation.

Trumpian Politics: Racism, Sexism, and Resentment of Social Change

Drawing upon the insights of Social Identity Theory,Footnote ¹ scholars contend that Barack Obama'south 2008 election and Hillary Clinton'southward nomination in 2016 signified a status threat to white males, who would at present exist more than receptive to rhetorical appeals and policies that could restore their preeminence in the social hierarchy. With respect to race, scholars accept noted that since Obama's election in 2008, expressions of white identity accept increased (Jardina Reference Jardina2014), as has the influence of racial counterinsurgency on partisan preferences (Tesler Reference Tesler2012). Furthermore, many white Americans now view themselves every bit a "disadvantaged grouping" (Valentino, Neuner, and Vandenbroek Reference Valentino, Neuner and Vandenbroek2018) and believe that condition gains for racial/indigenous minority groups inevitably reduce their own social condition (Wilkins and Kaiser Reference Wilkins and Kaiser2014). Most importantly for our purposes, such perceptions of condition threat have besides been linked to support for Trump (Major, Blodorn, and Major Blascovich Reference Major, Blodorn and Major Blascovich2018).

When individuals feel that their relative condition is under threat, they are more than likely to discriminate against (Branscombe and Wann Reference Branscombe and Wann1994), and showroom greater tolerance for expressions of hostility toward, out-groups (Valentino, Neuner, and Vandenbroek Reference Valentino, Neuner and Vandenbroek2018). Over the final several decades, "Symbolic Racism" (and other related constructsFootnote ⁱⁱ) has been employed to explain continuing opposition to policies that address racial inequities absent explicit behavior in biological inferiority/superiority (i.e., "Quondam-Fashioned Racism"Footnote ³). Accordingly, symbolic racism reflects beliefs that "blacks violate such traditional American values as individualism and self-reliance, the work ethic, obedience, and discipline" (Kinder and Sears Reference Kinder and Sears1981, 416). A number of studies have demonstrated the influence of symbolic racism on political attitudes (Kinder and Sanders Reference Kinder and Sanders1996; Sears et al. Reference Sears, Citrin, Cheleden, van Laar, Prentice and Miller1999; Kinder and Mendelberg Reference Kinder, Mendelberg, Sears, Sidanius and Bobo2000; Rabinowitz et al. Reference Rabinowitz, Sears, Sidanius and Krosnick2009) and support for Republican presidential candidates (Tesler and Sears Reference Tesler and Sears2010; Kinder and Dale-Riddle Reference Kinder and Dale-Riddle2012). Symbolic racism has also been shown to accept a negative upshot on back up for Barack Obama (Cake and Onwunli Reference Block and Chinonye2010; Lewis-Brook, Tien, and Nadeau Reference Lewis-Beck, Tien and Nadeau2010; Piston Reference Piston2010) and a positive consequence on support for Donald Trump (Luttig, Federico, and Lavine Reference Luttig, Federico and Lavine2017; Hooghe and Dassonneville Reference Hooghe and Dassonneville2018; Major, Blodorn, and Major Blascovich Reference Major, Blodorn and Major Blascovich2018; Schaffner, Macwilllams, and Nteta Reference Schaffner, Macwilllams and Nteta2018; Setzler and Yanus Reference Setzler and Yanus2018).

A wealth of literature similarly documents the overt and subtle forms of sexism that permeate American society and influence public evaluations of female person political figures (Huddy and Terklidsen Reference Huddy and Terkildsen1993; Streb et al. Reference Streb, Burrell, Frederick and Genovese2008). Despite the growing normative pressure against "Gender Traditionalism" and expressions of blatantly prejudicial sentiments against women in recent decades, "Modernistic Sexism" asserts that negative attitudes toward women persist through more subtle means (e.one thousand., denial of gender discrimination, antagonism toward demands for equality, and resentment of undeserved "special favors" for women) (Swim et al. Reference Swim, Aikin, Hall and Hunter1995).

While the prospect of electing the first female president would likely render sexism a more of import factor for voters regardless of the candidates, it may have been particularly pronounced in the 2016 election contextFootnote ⁴ given that Hillary Clinton has been a "lightning rod for antifeminist backfire" (McThomas and Tesler Reference McThomas and Tesler2016) dating back to her tenure as First Lady (Jamieson Reference Jamieson1995; Troy Reference Troy2006). Merely while sexism has been shown to be a powerful predictor of attitudes toward Clinton throughout much of her political careerFootnote ⁵, it also has a significant impact on evaluations of Donald Trump (Bock, Byrd-Craven, and Burkley Reference Bock, Byrd-Chicken and Burkley2017; Ratliff et al. Reference Ratliff, Redford, Conway and Smith2019) whose complicated personal history with womenFootnote ⁶ and numerous sexist statements during the campaign (Cohen Reference Cohen2017) entreatment to those harboring such beliefs.

Although these studies take made a valuable contribution to our understanding of Trump's political success, information technology is every bit important to examine the vehicles by which these sentiments are communicated and validated in a xx-first century political environment where even implicit or coded expressions of racism and sexism remain taboo. We contend that Trump'due south reliance on ACR and the rhetorical form of the jeremiad not only signaled his common cause with those who harbor racist and sexist beliefs, only more chiefly, legitimized them equally a socially adequate political expression vital to the restoration of American exceptionalism.

American Civil Religion

Although the notion of civil religion dates back to Machiavelli and Rousseau (Cristi and Dawson Reference Cristi and Dawson2007; Beiner Reference Beiner2010; Pierard Reference Pierard2010), our focus in this paper is on the concept'south American variant. In his foundational 1967 article, Robert Bellah described the ACR as having "played a crucial role in the development of American institutions" (Bellah Reference Bellah1967, three). In Bellah'southward business relationship, ACR was "selectively derived from Christianity [but] clearly not itself Christianity"Footnote ⁷ (Bellah Reference Bellah1967, seven) and manifested itself in "sacred" texts (Announcement of Independence, Constitution), myths (America every bit a "Pure Eden," the Revolution as Exodus), symbols (the flag, Washington as Moses, Lincoln as Christ), and rituals (presidential inaugurations, pledge of allegiance, Independence Mean solar day, Thanksgiving) (Bellah Reference Bellah1967, Reference Bellah1992; Angrosino Reference Angrosino2002). It is through exposure to such texts, myths, symbols, and rituals that individuals are socialized to adopt such behavior over the form of their lives.Footnote ⁸ For Bellah, this civil religion linked American politics with a larger, transcendent reality; he traced its origins and development through American history and expressed concern about its connected chapters to bind an increasingly divided nation. In the intervening half-century since Bellah's groundbreaking article, scholars have both subjected his thesis to critical engagement and congenital upon its foundations.Footnote ^ix Most recently, Gorski (Reference Gorski2017) positioned ACR as a "vital center" betwixt the extremes of religious nationalism and radical secularism, a language of American identity with the potential to build on the nation's foundational aspirations while acknowledging the deep injustices that persist.

ACR has often been linked, conceptually and politically, with American exceptionalism, the idea that the nation serves as the principal agent of God'due south meaningful activity in history (Bellah Reference Bellah1992; Skousen Reference Skousen2009). Such accounts tend to highlight the importance of John Winthrop's "Model of Christian Charity," with its invocation of a "city on a colina" and the Puritan covenant with God (Winthrop Reference Winthrop1630; see also Holland Reference Holland2008; Rodgers Reference Rodgers2018; van Engen Reference van Engen2020). The covenant was a promise to presume an "individual and commonage obligation to carry out God'due south volition on earth…[as] a light to all the nations" (Bellah Reference Bellah1967, 4, eighteen).

Nevertheless an undercurrent of anxiety has always been present alongside the confident proclamations of American chosenness, leading to deep expressions of business organization voiced by American elites. In The Broken Covenant, Bellah argued that deviations from these covenantal notions threatened an existential crunch of national identity. He focused on "times of trial", "periods of testing and then astringent that not only the form but even the existence of our nation take been called in question" (1992, 1). In situations where American practices flaunt the nation's professed principles, movements for reform frequently footing themselves squarely in those principles in their efforts to remake those practices (eastward.g., the Seneca Falls Declaration, Martin Luther King, Jr.'due south "I Have a Dream" voice communication). Such discourses oft have the form of a jeremiad, a rhetorical grade that has long offered Americans a means to deal with crisis and modify through a rededication to the shared national mission (Bercovitch Reference Bercovitch1978). Murphy (Reference White potato2009) describes the American jeremiad as equanimous of several components: (i) description of the electric current crunch, (two) a dissimilarity betwixt the current land of decline and a more virtuous past, (3) a call for renewal and reform, and (4) placement of the American experience in the context of larger claims about the nation's unique importance in homo history. Critics employing the jeremiad aspect economical, political, and armed forces crises to contradictions between sacred ethics and imperfect practices, and present the road to recovery as a process of revival and recommitment to those ideals. The "jeremiad's political and rhetoric ability, its ability to movement Americans to social and political action, lies in its capacity to evoke a dynamic tension betwixt despair and hope," and thus it "represents the nearly loyal patriotism fifty-fifty while engaging in the most strident dissent" (Murphy Reference Tater2009, 11, half-dozen).

Many scholars accept observed how Donald Trump's political rhetoric, with its refusal to offer even lip service to values like equality and liberty, represents a repudiation of the long tradition of ACR (Gorski Reference Gorski2017, Carlson Reference Carlson2018). However, such interpretations presume that there is a unmarried way to utilise civil religion, and downplay a rich history of contestation over such values (Hart Reference Hart1977; Williams and Alexander Reference Williams and Alexander1994; Wuthnow Reference Wuthnow1988; Demerath and Williams Reference Demerath and Williams1985; Cristi Reference Cristi1997; Hickel Reference Hickel2019). Nosotros contend that Donald Trump's campaign rhetoric to "Make America Great Again" contains central elements of a traditionalist civil religious jeremiad, which "understands the past's value to prevarication in its concrete social practices, institutions, and traditions, and lament[s] the customs's falling away from those practices" (Murphy Reference White potato2009, 109), and aims to restore an American golden age past recreating past conditions.

Donald Trump's Traditionalist Civil Religious Jeremiad

While all politicians suggest solutions to societal problems, Donald Trump'southward success (in function) reflects his ability to connect concerns virtually recent social changes with a compelling narrative virtually an existential crunch facing the nation. Lament over reject from a virtuous by represents 1 of the core elements of the American jeremiad, and thus the very structure of the Trump campaign slogan "Make America Great Again" points to its roots in that genre. (That President Trump has connected to stage MAGA rallies throughout his presidency suggests that it is not only a campaign slogan just also an enduring theme of the Trump presidency.)

In employing the jeremiad, Trump echoed previous presidents like Franklin Roosevelt, who framed major economical policy innovations during the Not bad Depression as a recommitment to the nation's founding ethics.Footnote ^x But while Roosevelt, and others similar him, recognized that the nation's unfulfilled national promise must be pursued in drastically changed manner from those of previous eras (what Tater describes equally a "progressive jeremiad" [2009, 137–138]), Trump's traditionalist jeremiad looks to the past as a model to be recreated equally literally as possible. As Pettigrew (2017, 112) puts it, "Brand America Great Over again" represents a advised reactionary telephone call to render to an earlier time when America's position in the world was unchallenged, when American presidents and Supreme Court judges were all White males, when immigration was restricted and widespread racial segregation persisted, and when the government'south affirmative action programs largely helped White males.

In other words, while progressive jeremiads legitimize novel reforms every bit means of actualizing the spirit of the nation's traditions in the contemporary context, traditionalist jeremiads legitimize a return to by practices every bit a ways to reclaim a "aureate age." For Trump and his supporters, the want to reclaim this golden age and "Brand America Smashing Over again" legitimized everything from his own personal predilections (e.g., saying "Merry Christmas" instead of "Happy Holidays," doctors making house calls, violently shutting down protesters) to policy aspirations (e.one thousand., rebuilding the American manufacturing sector, bringing back coal, capital punishment).

At the center of Trump's traditionalist ceremonious religious jeremiad lays an assertion that the pursuit of "political definiteness" by WA elites has generated policies that not but threaten the life, liberty, and material well-being of the populace, but have also produced an existential crisis for the nation. Considering attacks upon political correctness have long been a means past which those who harbor prejudicial attitudes can vocalism their preferences without garnering the social condemnation reserved for blatant expressions of prejudice, Trump'south rhetoric may be seen every bit a coded entreatment. In this way, nosotros can meet similarities to Nixon's "Southern Strategy," Reagan's emphasis on states' rights, and the use of the Willie Horton advertizing by George H.Westward. Bush. (Luttig, Federico, and Lavine Reference Luttig, Federico and Lavine2017; Pettigrew Reference Pettigrew2017)

Trump's comments on NFL national anthem protests help to illustrate this argument. Before long subsequently bragging about how Colin Kaepernick's difficulty finding a job was partially owing to NFL owners' concern near the backfire they might receive from Trump and his supporters, he remarked that:

We are one people and we share one organized religion. Whether we are black or brown or white, we all bleed the same red blood. We all salute the aforementioned bang-up American flag. And we are all fabricated by the aforementioned almighty God. Every bit long as we remember these truths, we will not neglect…. Together, we will make American potent again. We volition make America wealthy again. We will make America proud again. Nosotros will make America safety again. And nosotros will make America neat again!Footnote ¹¹

While Trump is ostensibly arguing that race should not carve up Americans, his assertion that "we all salute the aforementioned great American flag" implicitly characterizes those who protestation the national anthem (and hence protestation racial injustice in the criminal justice organization) as "un-American." Furthermore, because the restoration of American exceptionalism is dependent upon "remembering these truths," opposing protesters becomes a patriotic human activity. In this mode, Trump provides a means for the justification and expression of racial resentments while fugitive social stigma.

Trump'due south rhetorical attacks confronting political definiteness throughout his entrada and presidency often served to deflect criticism about his ain prejudicial language while simultaneously legitimizing its use. Peradventure the most prominent instance occurred during the commencement Republican primary argue in an commutation with Fox News's Megyn Kelly, who questioned Trump on his utilize of terms like "fat pigs, dogs, slobs, and disgusting animals" to describe women:

I think the big problem this country has is being politically correct…. I don't frankly accept time for total political correctness. And to exist honest with you, this country doesn't have time either.Footnote ¹²

Like processes were at work in his defense of restrictive clearing policy proposals:

America is more just a place on a map. America is a nation, America is a family. …we're going to have care of this country for our children and our grandchildren and our slap-up grandchildren. And we're not going to let people come into our country who are going to destroy our country. And that may or may non be politically right. But honestly, I don't intendance.Footnote ^xiii

Given that the majority of immigrants (undocumented or otherwise) are of Latin American descent, it is difficult to ignore the implication that such individuals are inherently a threat to the American manner of life. Similarly, in defending his proposed ban on travelers from bulk-Muslim countries, Trump argued:

Y'all're gonna have more than World Trade Centers…. We tin be politically correct and we can be stupid, but its going to become worse… Until we are able to…understand this trouble and the dangerous threat it poses. Our country cannot be the victim of horrendous attacks by people that believe only in jihad…Footnote ¹⁴

Trump would later seek to situate his characterization of people who don't respect American traditions and values every bit referring just to "Radical Islamic Terrorists," however his proposal banned everyone from those Muslim-majority countries who sought to enter the Usa.

In an attempt to deflect criticism that his policies and rhetoric were prejudicial, Trump's offered a series of arguments rooted in patriotism and the restoration of American exceptionalism:

[People] who want their laws enforced and respected…and who want their borders secured, are non racists. If yous want to have strong borders and so that people come into our state, but they come in legally through a legal procedure, that doesn't make you a racist…It makes you an American. They're all patriotic Americans.

People who speak out against radical Islam and who warn near refugees … are not Islamophobes…. They are decent American citizens who want to uphold our … tolerant society and who want to keep the terrorists … out of our country. If the pick is between saving lives or appeasing politically correct censors in Washington, D.C., that is the easiest choice you and I will ever have to brand. We volition ever choose saving American lives.Footnote ^xv

Collectively, these excerpts illustrate how rhetorical attacks against political definiteness functioned as a coded appeal to those who harbor racist and misogynistic attitudes. More importantly, his characterization of political correctness as an impediment—and his prejudicial policies as a prerequisite—to the realization of American greatness served to legitimize the expression of these resentments in a way less likely to garner social condemnation.

The Polarizing Event of Civil Religion

Although much of the literature on ACR presents information technology equally a consensual phenomenon with the potential to unify the land in times of trial (Bellah Reference Bellah1967; Adams Reference Adams1987; Pierard and Linder Reference Pierard and Linder1988; Roof Reference Roof2009), the pregnant of these shared symbols has always been contested (Hart Reference Hart1977; Demerath and Williams Reference Demerath and Williams1985; Wuthnow Reference Wuthnow1988; Williams and Alexander Reference Williams and Alexander1994; Cristi Reference Cristi1997; Hickel Reference Hickel2019). While the linguistic communication of sacred American nationality and imperiled national hope offer powerful tools of legitimation that tin can influence electoral and policy preferences (Wimberley Reference Wimberley1980; Wimberley and Christenson Reference Wimberley and Christenson1982; Chapp Reference Chapp2012), such behavior are not inherently associated with particular ideological/partisan preferences. In this regard, our approach diverges from the of import work of Whitehead and Perry (Reference Whitehead and Perry2015) and Whitehead, Perry, and Baker (Reference Whitehead, Perry and Baker2018), who focus more specifically on "Christian nationalism," which they define every bit "a prepare of beliefs and ideals that seek the national preservation of a supposedly unique Christian identity" (Reference Whitehead, Perry and Baker2018, 153). By contrast, our agreement of civil religion, drawing on scholars from Bellah to Gorski, posits it equally distinct from any item religious tradition, and as constituting less a monolithic ideology (a la Christian nationalism) and rather a gear up of symbolic or rhetorical tools.Footnote ^xvi

With this conceptualization in mind, civil religious soapbox is akin to a hammer which tin exist utilized to build or destroy. While a hammer does not inherently favor ane set of tasks over the other, those who wield it may very well have such preferences. But unlike a hammer, civil religion reflects core beliefs near the national identity, significant, and purpose in the world. Every bit such, the subjective perception that civil religion is utilized correctly or incorrectly tin have a powerful effect upon bystanders in a mode that a hammer does non.

We argue that the coupling of civil religious themes with ideological/partisan goals holds the potential to exacerbate pre-existing divisions. Doing and so not only validates the behavior of those who share one'south predispositions, only too denigrates ane's opponents as an "un-American" existential threat to the nation's sacred foundations. As such, the effect of civil religious behavior on attitudes toward Trump depends upon whether ane agrees with the partisan/ideological goals he has sought to legitimize. Considering the positive effect of civil religious beliefs among those predisposed to agree with Trump is likely to be offset by the negative consequence of these beliefs among those predisposed to challenge him, we do not anticipate that civil religious beliefs volition take a significant independent affect upon attitudes toward the President.

As we take previously mentioned, the extant literature demonstrates a strong relationship between racist and misogynistic beliefs and support for Trump. Furthermore, our analysis of his traditionalist civil religious jeremiad demonstrates that his rhetoric serves to legitimize such prejudicial beliefs as vital to the restoration of American exceptionalism. As such, nosotros contend that the confluence of ceremonious religious behavior and racist/misogynistic attitudes will produce more support for Trump than either in isolation precisely considering the former validates the latter. Furthermore, civil religious Americans who abhor such prejudicial attitudes should express greater opposition to Trump than non-civil religious Americans because they regard his use of these themes every bit a betrayal of the nation'due south sacred identity. In other words, the presence of civil religious behavior will exacerbate the effects of prejudicial attitudes on support/opposition to Donald Trump.

Hypothesis—There volition be a pregnant interaction effect between civil religious behavior and racism/sexism on attitudes toward Donald Trump.

Information and Methods

This project relies on data obtained from the 2018 CCES, a nationally stratified sample survey administered online past YouGov in two waves. The pre-election wave was conducted from late September to late October and the postal service-ballot wave was administered in November 2018. Half of the questionnaire consists of common content administered to over 50,000 participants, while the remaining questions are submitted by teams of researchers to be administered to subsets of 1,000 respondents. All variables employed in the subsequent analysis are derived from common content or our unique module that was administered in the post-election wave.

Inside our unique module, a subset of participants (n = 424) were asked to register their level of understandingFootnote ¹⁷ with a series of civil religious statements inspired by previous studies (Wimberley et al. Reference Wimberley, Clelland, Hood and Lipsey1976; Christenson and Wimberly Reference Christenson and Wimberley1978; Chapp Reference Chapp2012; Hickel Reference Hickel2019)

• CRQ1—"The Founding Fathers instilled God-given values that accept fabricated America a cracking nation."

• CRQ2—"America is God's chosen nation."

• CRQ3—"America has a God-given responsibility to be an example of freedom and equality for all nations."

• CRQ4—"Our nation volition suffer if we carelessness our founding principles."

Figure ane depicts the distribution of responses to these questions. With the exception of CRQ2, the plurality of respondents expressed strong agreement with the civil religious statements. Possibly attributable to the omission of the word "God" from CRQ4Footnote ¹⁸, the percentage of stiff agreement and hateful response was higher compared to the other questions. Interestingly, a plurality of respondents strongly disagreed with CRQ2. Despite these differences, factorFootnote ¹⁹ and reliabilityFootnote ^xx analyses demonstrate that it is appropriate to combine these questions into a Civil Religious Belief CalibrationFootnote ²¹ that tin can serve as our master independent variable of involvement.Footnote ²²

Figure 1. Response distribution for civil religious conventionalities questions.

We evaluate our hypothesized relationships with two dependent variables operationalized to capture attitudes toward Trump. The offset is a traditional measure out of job blessing asked during the postal service-election wave of the survey and scaled such that positive values indicate higher levels of support.Footnote ²³ The second is a composite measure of emotional impact in response to Donald Trump'southward presidential campaign slogan "Brand American Great Again." During the post-election wave of the survey, participants were asked to indicate whether information technology made them experience "Happy," "Sad," "Broken-hearted," "Excited," "Angry," "Proud," or "I'thou Not Certain."Footnote ²⁴ In constructing this mensurate, respondents began at 0 then received a +ane for each positive emotion selected ("Happy," "Excited," "Proud"), and a −one for each negative emotion selected ("Pitiful," "Anxious," "Angry").Footnote ²⁵ Although this survey question did not allow u.s. to measure the strength of each detail emotion, this dependent variable does capture the range of emotions reported. Equally such, it may exist interpreted as an indication of the overall strength and management of an private'due south emotional response to this critical attribute of Trump'south civil religious jeremiad.

The existing literature is quite clear that symbolic racism and modern sexism are stiff predictors of support for Donald Trump. As such, our assay incorporates a scale of "Racial Resentment"Footnote ²⁶ and "Resentment of Feminism,"Footnote ²⁷ derived from questions provided as mutual content in the post-election wave of the survey. In addition to our key variables, nosotros account for standard demographic controls and a number of theoretically important confounders such every bit party identification, political ideology, political knowledge, and absolutism. Due to space limitations, we provide a detailed discussion of these variables (along with unweighted summary statistics of all variables) in the Appendix.

Results

Our research relies on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressionFootnote ²⁸ to evaluate our hypothesized interaction between civil religious beliefs and racial resentment and resentment of feminism on support for Donald Trump and emotional reactions to his "Make America Great Over again" campaign slogan. For each dependent variable, nosotros separately examine the interaction betwixt ceremonious religious behavior and racial resentment (Tables 1a and 2a), and the interaction betwixt civil religious beliefs and resentment of feminism (Tables 1a and 2a).Footnote ²⁹ The first column in each table presents the independent effects of civil religious behavior, racial resentment, and resentment of feminism (model i). The 2d and third columns contain the interaction term between civil religious beliefs and the resentment measure, and a fully specified model with all of the control variables (models 2 and 3, respectively).Footnote ³⁰ We brainstorm by discussing our analysis of support for Trump earlier moving on to emotional reactions to his campaign slogan.

Table la. Regression analyzing Trump approval with CR/race resent. interaction

Table 1b. Regression analyzing Trump approval with CR/FEM. reset interaction

Tabular array 2a. Regression analyzing Trump affect with CR/race resent. interaction

Tabular array 2b. Regression analyzing Trump touch with CR/race resent. interaction

Consistent with the existing scholarship, Tables 1a and 1b illustrates that racial resentment and resentment of feminism have significant positive effects upon Trump's approving in each model specification. While civil religious beliefs do take a pregnant positive outcome in models 1 and 2, information technology fails to attain statistical significance once our control variables are introduced in model 3 (equally expected). Nearly chiefly, the hypothesized interaction betwixt civil religious behavior and racial resentment/resentment of feminism is significant in each model. Figures 1a and 1b depict the estimated marginal means (with 95% confidence intervals) of each interaction from model 3 while holding all covariates at their means. They illustrate that as the level of ceremonious religious belief increases, support for Trump besides increases amidst those with college levels of resentment and decreases among those on the reverse stop of the resentment scales. Equally such, the presence of civil religious beliefs exacerbates the event of preexisting sentiments with respect to race and gender.Footnote ³¹

Figure 1a and b. (a) Estimated marginal means: Trump approval (racial resentment interaction). (b) Estimated marginal means: Trump approval (resentment of feminism interaction).

Before moving forward, it is worth noting that the fully specified models do a very skillful task explaining the variance in approval of Trump (Adj. R ⁱⁱ ≈ 0.682). While the majority of demographic indicators did not have a significant effect in these models, Political party Identification and Ideological Orientation were both significant predictors.Footnote ³² Furthermore, Authoritarianism also failed to register a significant effect in these models.Footnote ³³

Tables 2a and 2b presents the results of a similar analysis focused on emotional reactions toward Trump's "Make America Great Again" slogan. Once again racial resentment and resentment of feminism accept significant positive effects in each of the models. As earlier, while ceremonious religious beliefs did have a significant independent effect in models one and 2, it failed to attain significance in the fully specified model (model three). As hypothesized, the interaction between civil religious behavior and racial resentment/resentment of feminism is significant in each model. Figures 2a and 2b describe the estimated marginal means (with 95% confidence intervals) of each interaction in model 3 while holding all covariates at their means. They illustrate that as the level of ceremonious religious belief increases, emotional reactions toward Trump'due south campaign slogan become increasingly positive amidst those with higher levels of resentment and decrease amongst those on the contrary end of the resentment scales. As before, the presence of civil religious behavior exacerbates the effects of racism and sexism.

Effigy two. (a) Estimated marginal means: Trump bear on (racial resentment interaction). (b) Estimated marginal ways: Trump affect (resentment of feminism interaction).

Further, these fully specified models also do an excellent job of explaining the variance in emotional reactions toward "Make America Keen Again" (Adj. R ² ≈ 0.670). Once again, Party identification and Ideological orientation were significant predictorsFootnote ³⁴ while the remaining demographic indicators failed to attain statistical significance. Interestingly, in these models, Authoritarianism did take a significant positive result on emotional reactionsFootnote ³⁵. Although it goes across our scope to provide a definitive explanation for this discrepancy, this finding may suggest that respondents exhibiting these characteristics are more supportive of the vision articulated during the entrada and somewhat disillusioned past the actual job Trump has washed while in office.

Give-and-take and Conclusion

Many observers viewed Trump'due south offensive prejudicial rhetoric equally an impediment that could non be overcome. Although he did not win the popular vote, and failed to secure majority support for his presidency, his political "success" continues to defy expectations. While much of this can be explained by pointing to the continuing influence of party identification/ideological orientation and the prevalence of racism/sexism in American society, nosotros believe it is equally important to sympathize how the latter is communicated and legitimized. Consequent with the extant literature, our results confirm that symbolic racism and modern sexism are powerful predictors of attitudes toward Trump. However, our results also confirm our expectations that civil religious behavior exacerbate the influence of these sentiments. Civil religious individuals who harbor these prejudicial attitudes are more supportive of Donald Trump than similar individuals who are not civil religious (and vice versa). MAGA, then, represents a traditionalist civil religious jeremiad that legitimizes the expression of racist and sexist sentiments as vital to the reassertion of American exceptionalism.

However, it is important to clarify that we are not making a causal claim that Trump'southward rhetoric necessarily influenced or acquired these individuals to develop racist and misogynist views. Our data do not allow for such a claim, and we doubtable that information technology would not be accurate given the extant literature on the socialization of racism and sexism. Our analysis highlights the relationship between Trump'due south use of civil religious rhetoric and the racial and gendered resentments held past many of his supporters. Rather than generating these resentments, we fence that ceremonious religious framing provided a legitimizing discourse that allowed potential Trump supporters to make sense of their pre-existing resentments. The idea of making America smashing "once again" framed American greatness as a in one case and future phenomenon, and enabled Trump to present white, male resentment as the justified response to contempo American social and political developments.

Similarly, it should be acknowledged that the nature of our data precludes us from ruling out the possibility of an endogenous relationship whereby ceremonious religious behavior sally in response to pre-existing resentments and attitudes toward Donald Trump. Because civil religious beliefs accept been historically conceptualized as being socialized through a diversity of texts, myths, symbols, and rituals throughout an individual's lifetime (Bellah Reference Bellah1967, Reference Bellah1992), we are confident in our hypothesized relationships. Notwithstanding, we concede that the salience and intensity of such beliefs could exist influenced past changes in the political context. Future scholars are therefore encouraged to gather information (e.yard., survey experimentation and/or panel data) that would enable the evaluation of this potential.

Despite these limitations, this inquiry too helps us to better understand Trump'due south complicated relationship with religious voters. Trump's emphasis on nominating judges who will defend traditional values, as well as his laments nigh the "War on Christmas" and the notion that Christianity is "under attack," signaled his common cause with this important constituency of the Republican Party. Just while Trump advocated policy positions popular amid religious conservatives and selected Mike Pence every bit his running mate, his personal history and lack of familiarity with the BibleFootnote ³⁶ limited his ability to talk about religion every bit authentically as other Republican (or Democratic) candidates, and may account for why this analysis failed to detect a pregnant human relationship betwixt i's religiosity or Christian affiliation and support for President Trump. On the other paw, given the positive relationship that religiosity and religious affiliation have with civil religious behavior (Chapp Reference Chapp2012; Hickel Reference Hickel2019; and demonstrated in Appendix Table two), it is possible that his traditionalist ceremonious religious jeremiad similarly polarized the religious vote depending upon their prejudicial attitudes. In this context, information technology is worth noting the stark split betwixt liberal and bourgeois understandings of Christian beliefs and practices, which intertwine inextricably with partisan political leanings (although the causal direction of this human relationship remains controversial; see Margolis Reference Margolis2018). Although religious conservatives are more than probable to report holding racist or sexist attitudes than religious liberals, and religious Americans are more likely to hold ceremonious religious views than non-religious Americans, we do not think that the phenomena we accept reported here are only reducible to a liberal-conservative Christian dichotomy. The intersections of religiosity, civil organized religion, and Trumpian politics, we would advise, are circuitous and multidirectional. We therefore encourage future researchers to elaborate upon the nature of these interrelationships.

Finally, this research illustrates the utility of examining our begrudging politics through the lens of national identity conflict. The 2016 election entrada was in many ways a battle over the national identity with both candidates evoking civil religious themes to legitimize their perspectives. Hillary Clinton'southward "Stronger Together" campaign emphasized the benefits that diversity brings to American society and how this has been an integral component of the national identity throughout its history (Sides Reference Sides2017). In dissimilarity, Donald Trump's "Make America Nifty Once again" coupled with his primal entrada pledge to build a edge wall and impose a ban on travel from Muslim-bulk countries suggests that the nation's return to glory hinges upon exclusion. While Bellah viewed civil religion as fostering integration and unity every bit the salience of an American identity superseded other group identities (Bellah Reference Bellah1967), our research is consistent with other piece of work demonstrating that such rhetoric has also been employed to exclude certain groups from the American family (Beasley Reference Beasley2004; Weller Reference Weller2013). Murphy argues that "all jeremiads subdivide their respective communities into those accounted faithful to the founders' examples and those apostates who have squandered national promise" (2009, 120). Seen in this lite, Clinton's campaign reflected a national identity that excludes those who hold prejudicial attitudes from the American family while Trump'due south rhetoric and actions emboldened them. We encourage others to more explicitly consider the role of such rhetoric in exacerbating these divisions in American lodge.

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Source: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/politics-and-religion/article/making-america-exceptional-again-donald-trumps-traditionalist-jeremiad-civil-religion-and-the-politics-of-resentment/B4409874C5D4EE92887D7D3B939AF4ED

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